

4 September 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
Deputy Chief, FE Division

SUBJECT : Comments on "The Afternoon Scenario"

I think all the points or major areas are covered but do offer here for your consideration a few editorial items of detail it would be helpful to have clarified. My comments are keyed to your paragraph numbers:

1. We can also point out that the independent record from the depositions we have in hand of [REDACTED] interrogations in Saigon (the depositions being statements by his interrogators) that [REDACTED] other interview-type interrogations may have been held on the 11th. Thus, the implied future tense reference [REDACTED] that is found in all accounts we have of the [REDACTED] meeting, argues inferentially for a 10 June date rather than a 12 June date.

2. No comment.

3. The COS suite has three private offices coming off of the central room in which there were desks for three secretaries on my last visit. Two of these offices are small, one (Shackley's) is large. If the meeting was held in the COS suite it would be useful to clarify precisely which office it was held in, particularly if it was Shackley's office. If Ted happened to be downstairs with the Ambassador or across town somewhere when the meeting was held, it might very well have been convened in Shackley's office, since the other two private offices in the COS suite are small and would be cramped quarters for a four-person meeting. It is also possible that the meeting was held in the office of the Chief of the Combined Studies Division located in the MACV compound. Such a setting could also have provided a context germane to the point we are trying to unearth: Did [REDACTED] convey the impression that he was Chief of Station or leave such an impression in the minds of his military visitors? Many army elements think that Combined Studies is "the Station." It is conceivable that [REDACTED] was introduced as the head of Combined

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25X1 Studies or that [] referred to him as "my boss" in a way that was
misinterpreted by [] 25X1

25X1 4. To the extent that circumstances permit, try to clarify the
discrepancies on who said what and who remained silent when, that now
appear in [] memoranda on this meeting as compared with [] 25X1

25X1 5. In addition, it would be helpful to clarify [] stated
reason for the meeting. The initial 5 July telepouch (paragraph one) mentions
that [] came "to discuss coordination of an operation under DCID 5/1."
25X1 No one has ever told us what this operation was or how the []
was raised in the context of a conversation about this other, unknown matter. 25X1

25X1 6. You have half the possible story. The other half is that during
the course of this conversation on 10 or 12 June, it became clearly apparent
that [] believed [] was Chief of Station and neither 25X1
25X1 [] did anything specific to disabuse their two military
visitors of this impression. If this latter hypothesis is close to what in
25X1 fact actually happened, then [] could more or less truthfully answer
negatively the questions put down in your memorandum. What we need to
determine is whether anything stated or atmospherically surrounding that
meeting could have given the impression to the two officers, or confirmed
25X1 their misconception, that [] was COS.

25X1 7 & 8. This may be the opportunity to sort out just how many meetings
there were between 10/12 and 16 June. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the original
5 July telepouch speak of one meeting with [] on 16 June but clearly 25X1
imply either a second meeting or at least some form of follow-up visit or
25X1 phone call at which [] name was given and revised views of []
assessment were also presented.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

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